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United States v. Higgs
353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003)
I. Facts
On January 26, 1996, Dustin John Higgs ("Riggs"), Willie Mark Haynes
("Haynes"), and Victor Gloria picked up Tanji Jackson ("Jackson"), Tamika
Black, and Mishann (Iiinn in Riggs's blue Mazda MPV van in Washington, D.C
and drove to Riggs's home in Laurel, Maryland. Once there, they drank alcohol,
which theystopped to purchase en route, and listened to music. After midnight,
Higgs and Jackson started to fight. They argued, and Jackson grabbed a knife
from the kitchen. Although Haynes eventuallyconvinced Jackson to relinquish
the blade, the three women left the apartment in bitter spirits.'
As Jackson departed, she threatened the men with the prospect that her
friends would exact vengeance, either byrobbing or assaulting Riggs and his two
friends. Iggs, who knewJackson, lent some credence to the threat. He became
more disturbed when, through his apartment window, he saw her writing down
the license plate number of his van. iggs grabbed his coat and a .38-caliber
handgun and left the apartment. Followed byhis two friends, Higgs boarded the
van and drove it to where the women were walking along the side of the road
sometime after 3:30 a.m.. Haynes, per Iggs's instructions, got out of the van
and convinced the three women to ride with them Believing theywere receiving
a ride home, the three acquiesced. Rather than taking them back to Washington,
D.C, however, R-iggs drove them to Patuxent National Park. iggs stopped the
van in a secluded location, and when the women asked if they would be forced
to walk home from the park, "iggs responded, 'something like that. "'2
The three women exited the van, and iggs gave the gun to Haynes. With
the weapon hidden behind his back, Haynes left the van and shot each of the
three women. The men drove away from the scene and threw the gun into the
Anacostia River. Theythen proceeded to throw away all of the items in R-iggs's
apartment that the women may have touched that evening in hopes of eradicat-
ing any evidence that the female visitors had been in the apartment?
After a lengthy investigation, the grand jury finally indicted Higgs on
December 21, 1998, "for three counts each of first-degree premeditated murder,
first-degree murder committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
1. United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2003). One possible reason for
the meeting and falling out was that Higgs believed Jackson was "snitching" regarding an unrelated
credit card crime. Id at 292.
2. Id at 290 (quoting J.A 482).
3. Id
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a kidnapping, [and] kidnapping resulting in death."4 The Government then filed
its notice to seek the death penalty on all nine counts.' Subsequently, the grand
jury returned a superseding indictment and the Government amended its earlier
death notice.6 The petit jury found Hlggs guilty on all nine charges and found
that each charge warranted a death sentence The judge sentenced HIggs to nine
death sentences! On appeal, Higgs argued, inter alia, that the indictment was
insufficient to support his capital conviction because it did not allege the aggra-
vating and intent factors required by statute for capital cases.'
I. Hddig
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit conducted a de
novo examination of the sufficiency of the indictment." The court held that the
indictment must allege at least one statutory aggravating and intent factor but
need not allege nonstatutory aggravating factors." The court found that the
intent factors were clearly alleged in the indictment.12 Additionally, the court
decided that the indictment was sufficient for the six murder charges because it
alleged that the victim died in the course of another crime, which is a statutory
4. Id at 291, 294 (internal citations omitted); see 18 U.S.C. S 1111(a) (2000) (stating that
premeditated murder is murder in the first degree, as is murder committed in the course of a
kidnapping or an attempted kidnapping); 18 U.S.C S 1201(a) (2000) (providing that a kidnapping
which results in the death of the victim is a capital offense).
5. Him, 353 F.3d at 294; sw 18 U.S.C S 3593(a) (2000) (requiring the prosecution to give
notice to a defendant when the prosecution believes death is the appropriate sentence and intends
to seek it).
6. Hig, 353 F.3d at 294.
7. Id at 295.
8. Id
9. d; se 18 U.S.C. S 3591(a)(2) (2000) (requiring that the sentencer find one of the
enumerated intent factors before a defendant may be sentenced to death); 18 U.S.C. S 3592(c)
(2000) (setting forth the aggravating factors that must be found by the jury or court to support a
sentence of death). -figgs also challenged his sentence on a number of other grounds, incuding
that bydenying his motion to change venue, the district court subjected him to an unfair and partial
jury, that the district court made various erroneous rulings during the guilt and sentencing phases
of his trial, and that enhanced sentences were erroeouslyimposed on him for other firearm charges
related to the murder and kidnapping charges. Higgy, 353 F.3d at 307, 309, 314, 333. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declined to grant relief on any of these claims. Id
at 289.
10. H4p, 353 F.3d at 295. In the Fourth Circuit, the appellate court reviews de novo a
challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment. Id; se, eg, United States v. Bolden, 325 F.3d 471,
486 (4th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Fourth Circuit will "review de novo a challenge to the validity
of an indictment"); United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Or. 1997) (same).
11. Higs, 353 F.3d at 298.
12. Id at 299.
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aggravator." The court also found that all nine capital sentences were supported
bythe prior conviction aggravators. 4 Although the indictment did not allege that
Higgs had prior convictions, the court found that the indictment did not need to
allege those statutoryaggravators. s Moreover, the court decided that even if the
indictment was deficient, the error would still be harmless and not subject to
reversal. 6
III. A nrdlis
A. W4xer te IianmnMwt A #ee e Inter Elent and Stawmry and
Nons A raou i
Higgs argued that the United States Supreme Court's holdings in App, ii
v NewJenie97 and Ringv A nzom mandated that any factor that must be found
by a jury must also be in the indictment.19 In Alpendi the Court held, "[o]ther
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penaltyfor a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."2" In Ri the Court applied the Appmrni
rationale to the aggravating factors necessaryto increase a life sentence to a death
sentence and found that they were the "functional equivalent of an element of
a greater offense" and must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reason-
able doubt.2 However, in that case the Court did not consider whether the
indictment needed also to allege the aggravating factors necessary to support a
death sentence.22 Nonetheless, the Court had previouslystated that the facts that
enhanced a sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be alleged in the
indictment.23
The Fourth Circuit had little difficulty finding that the statutory aggravator
and intent factor did enhance a defendant's sentence and therefore must be
13. Id at 301.
14. Id at 300.
15. Id at 302.
16. Id at 307.
17. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
18. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
19. Him, 353 F.3d at 297; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000) (declaring
that facts that, if found, increase a sentence past the statutory maximum must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, apart from the fact of a prior conviction); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 589 (2002) (extending Apprezai to include facts that, if found, would increase a sentence from
life imprisonment to death).
20. AppmnA 530 U.S. at 490.
21. Ri* 536 U.S. at 589, 609 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. Id at 597 n.4.
23. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (noting that Apprami requires that
facts that must be found bya jury must also be in the indictment).
2004]
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included in the indictment.24 To support a death sentence, the jurymust find one
of the intent factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. S 3591(a)(2) and one of the aggravating
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3592.25 Following Rug and Appmzi, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the aggravating and intent factors acted as functional
elements of the crimes charged because a defendant could onlybe eligible for the
death sentence if both were proven.26 Thus, the Fourth Circuit held that both
must be contained in the indictments.27
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit decided that nonstatutoryaggravators, which
are aggravators not listed in S 3592 but are nonetheless considered during
sentencing, need not be alleged in the indictment. 28 Rather than render a defen-
dant death-eligible, nonstatutory aggravators merely help the factfinder select
among different sentencing options.2 Because proof of nonstatutoryaggravators
alone would not suffice to qualify the defendant for a death penalty, the court
decided that they did not need to be specified in the indictment."0
B. Hi&'s Irlimrt
1. Intent Factors
Before a court may impose a death sentence, the factfinder must find one
or more of the intent factors contained in S 3592(a)(2)." Two such factors are
"intentional acts to take a life and intentional acts of violence creating a grave risk
of death."32 The indictment alleged that Hggs murdered his victims "byshoot-
ing [them] with a firearm, willfully, deliberately, maliciously, and with premedita-
tion, and in the perpetration of ... kidnapping."3 The court determined that the
24. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 297-98.
25. 18 U.S.C § 3591(a) (2000) (requiring that the juryfind one of several listed intent factors
to support a death sentence); 18 U.S.C S 3592 (2000) (enumerating the aggravating factors); se 18
U.S.C S 3593(e) (2000) (requiring that one of the aggravating factors be found before the judge or
jury decides if death is the appropriate punishment); Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-77
(1999) (noting that before a death sentence maybe imposed both the intent and statutoryaggravat-
ing factors must be found).
26. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 298.
27. Id
28. Id at 299.
29. Id at 298.
30. Id at 299.
31. Id;se 18 U.S.C § 3591(a)(2) (2000) (stating that the defendant maybe sentenced to death
only if the prosecution proves one or more of the intent factors).
32. Hi, 353 F.3d at 299; see 18 U.S.C S 3591(a)(2) (2000) (setting forth the statutoryintent
factors).
33. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 299 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original).
[Vol. 16:2
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Ultimately, the petit jury in Higgs's trial found three aggravating factors
listed mi 3592(c) for all nine capital counts: (1) multiple killings in one criminal
event; (2) a prior conviction involving a firearm in a violent felony; and (3) a prior
conviction for a "serious federal drug offense."35 Additionally, the jury found
that the six counts of first-degree murder occurred during another crime, kidnap-
ping, another statutory aggravator. 6  Hggs argued that the indictment was
defective for failing to allege each of the statutory aggravating factors that the
juryfound. 7 The court rejected this argument and noted that because only one
statutory aggravator was necessary to support a death sentence, only one must
be alleged in the indictment.38 Therefore, the court concluded that if the one
statutory aggravator contained in the indictment is also found by the petit jury,
then no defect exists in the indictment with respect to the charge of a death-
eligible offense.39 Aggravating factors, statutory or otherwise, in excess of those
charged in the indictment but found bythe jury are merely"sentencing consider-
"40ations.
,z The "Mulape Killip " A ggraw2or
The Government argued that the indictment was not defective with respect
to any of the nine charges because it alleged that multiple killings occurred in a
sole criminal episode, which is a statutory aggravator." This aggravator was not
added to the statute until April of 1996, after the murders had already occurred.42
34. Id
35. Id at 300; sw 18 U.S.C S 3592(c)(16) (2000) (listing multiple killings as an aggravating
factor); § 3592(c)(2) (enumerating a prior conviction for a violent felony with a firearm as an
aggravating factor); § 3592(c)(12) (stating that a prior conviction for a federal drug offense of a
serious nature constitutes an aggravating circumstance).
36. Higg;, 353 F.3d at 300; sw § 3592(c)(1) (stating that the aggravating element is satisfied if
the murder occurred during the commission of another offense).
37. Hio, 353 F.3d at 299.
38. Id; seeUnited States v.Jackson, 327 F.3d 273,287 (4th Cir. 2003) (NiemeyerJ., concur-
ring) (stating that if a death sentence depends on proof of an aggravated offense, then all elements
of the offense and at least one aggravating factor must be in the indictment). For a complete
discussion of Jackson see generally Meghan H Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 221 (2003)
(analyzing United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273 (4th Cr. 2003)).
39. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 299.
40. Id
41. Id at 300; see§ 3592(c)(16) (stating that multiple killings committed during one rriminal
episode is an aggravating factor).
42. Hit, 353 F.3d at 300.
2004]
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The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Nimth Amendment generally prohibits the
legislature from passing a law that would criminalize an act otherwise innocent
when committed, increase the corresponding sentence to a crime subsequent to
its commission, or deprive a defendant of a defense available when the act was
committed.43 The clause, however, does not ensure that a defendant will always
be tried under the law as it existed at the time of the offense." Nonetheless, the
court held that finding that "multiple killings" was a statutory aggravator in
Higgs's case would amount to a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause because
it "clearly'increase[d] the punishment for criminal acts."' 45 Therefore, the court
found that although the indictment alleged "multiple killings," it would not
support the death sentence because "multiple killings" was not a statutory
aggravator, due to the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the indictment needed to allege
one statutory aggravator to be sufficient.46
b. The " ,r C wnr" Agrawtor
The court found that the indictment did satisfy the statutory aggravator
requirement with respect to the six first-degree murder charges.47  Under
3592(c)(1), killing during one of certain enumerated crimes, or an attempt to
commit such crimes, constitutes an aggravating factor." The indictment in
Higgs's case alleged that the murder was committed "in the perpetration of, and
attempted perpetration of a felony, to wit, kidnapping."49 Therefore, the court
decided that the indictment clearly alleged a statutory aggravating factor for, and
was not defective with respect to, the six murder counts."0 However, the court
did not find that the aggravating factor was sufficient to support the kidnapping
death sentences because, even if it could have been used as an aggravating factor
43. Id; see US. CONST. art. I, S 9, cl 3 (prohibiting Congress from passing an ex post facto
law); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 US. 282, 292 (1977) (stating that a law that penalizes "as a crime an
act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the
punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any
defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed" violates the ex post
facto clause (internal quotation marks omitted)).
44. SeeDdohe, 432 U.S. at 292-93 (noting the limits of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
45. Hits, 353 F.3d at 300-01 (quoting California Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
504 (1995)). Moralz concerned a state law, hence, the Supreme Court examined the law under U.S.
CONST. art. I, 5 10, which prohibits the states from passing ex post facto laws. Unpaw US. CONST.
art. I, S 10 (forbidding the states from passing ex post facto laws), uith US. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl
3 (providing that Congress shall pass no ex post facto law).
46. H4g, 353 F.3d at 301.
47. Id
48. Id; swe 18 U.S.C S 3592(c)(1) (2000) (stating that "[d]eath during the commission of
another crime" is an aggravator).
49. Hi4, 353 F.3d at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id
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for the kidnappings, it was not submitted to the jury in connection with the
kidnapping counts."1
c Prior CiairpA rauztos
The Government argued that the indictment was not defective with respect
to anyof the nine charges because the juryrelied on the prior conviction aggrava-
tors, which need not be alleged in the indictment, in choosing the death
sentence.5 2 In A Invram-Tones u UnitedStates, 3 the Supreme Court held that a
sentence enhancement for a prior conviction was:
[A] penaltyprovision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the
sentence for a recidivist. It does not define a separate crime. Conse-
quently, neither the statute nor the Constitution requires the Govern-
ment to charge the factor that it mentions, an earlier conviction, in theindictmnen t!
Later, the Court bolstered its decision by noting that recidivism traditionallywas
a sentencing factor, not an element of a crime, and that there was less need for
constitutional safeguards, such as a finding bya jurybeyond a reasonable doubt,
in expanding a sentence based on a prior conviction because that prior convic-
tion was presumablyobtained through attendant Constitutional safeguards in the
first trial.5" Therefore, the Fourth Circuit decided that prior convictions clearly
constituted an exception to the requirement that indictments allege all factors
that could enhance a sentence past the statutory maximurn' Biggs acknowl-
edged the exception, but argued that Ring called the continuing vigor of
A 1n rlvm- Torm into doubt."' The Fourth Circuit noted that Ringspecificallyleft
that question untouched and declined to rule contrary to A narz- Tortm. s
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit upheld the sufficiency of the indictments with
respect to all nine charges because the statutory aggravators regarding previous
convictions, relied on by the petit jury, did not need to be alleged in the indict-
ments 59
51. Id
52. Id; se 18 U.S.C § 3592(c)(2), (12) (2000) (stating that prior convictions for serious drug
offenses and violent felonies involving firearms are statutory aggravators).
53. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
54. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 US. 224, 226-27 (1998).
55. Hi*, 353 F.3d at 302-03 (quotingJc-, 526 u.s. at 248).
56. Id at 304.
57. d at 303.
58. Id; see Rn, 536 U.S. at 597 n4 (noting that the petitioner's death sentence was not
supported by a finding of prior convictions and therefore the continuing validity of A nmivu-
Tonm was not at stake in the case).




Additionally, the court found that even if the indictment was defective,
Riggs would still not be entitled to a reversal because the error would have been
harmless.61 Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, error is harmless if" 'it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contrib-
ute to the verdict obtained.' "61 Indeed, " ' most constitutional errors can be
harmless.' "62 The Fourth Circuit noted that the primary function of an indict-
ment is to inform the defendant of the charges and provide the defendant with
enough information to determine if double jeopardy has attached.63 The Court
found that, even if it was error not to include the aggravators in the indictment,
such an error would be harmless because the indictment charged the defendant
under statutes that carried a maximumpenaltyof death apid the subsequent death
notice actually alleged each aggravating factor the Government sought to prove
at trial.64 Therefore, iggs was actually given a fair apprisal of the charges he
faced, and if any elements were omitted from the indictment, such error could
not have contributed to the verdict." Moreover, because the petit jury later
found the aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt, "Higgs was not prejudiced by
the lack of an independent judgment of the grand jury." " Finally, the court
stated that any error would have been harmless because the evidence of Higgs's
prior convictions was not contested at trial.67 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit
found that even if it was error to omit the aggravators from the indictment, such
error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."68
iggs argued that review for harmless-error was inappropriate because the
failure to allege aggravators in the indictment was a structural error that required
immediate reversal and was thus not subject to harmless-error review.69 The
Supreme Court has found structural error only in the limited set of cases in
60. Id
61. Id (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15 (1999)).
62. Id (quoting Neir, 527 U.S. at 8).
63. Id at 306; seeRussellv. United States, 369 U.S. 749,763-64 (1962) (noting that the Court
has repeatedly emphasized the importance of the indictment in apprising a defendant of the nature
of the charges and whether a defense of double jeopardy is available).
64. Higg, 353 F.3d at 306-07.
65. Id
66. Id at 307; seeUnited States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66,70 (1986) (finding that improprieties
affecting a grand jury's charging decision were harmless in light of subsequent conviction).
67. Hig;s, 353 F.3d at 307; seNe kr, 527 US. at 16 (holding that omission of an element in
the indictment was harmless when the evidence supporting the element at trial was great and the
defendant did not try to contest it).
68. HiggF, 353 F.3d at 307.
69. Id at 304; seNeekr, 527 U.S. at 8-9 (stating that structural errors are presumed to affect
the defendant's rights because they destroy the procedural safeguards that insure a fundamentally
fair trial).
[Vol. 16:2
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which the impropriety impacted the entire framework of the trial itself and was
not just an error in process." For example, the Court has held that allowing
proof below the standard of reasonable doubt, entirely depriving a defendant of
counsel or the right to represent herself, judicial bias, and conducting trials closed
to the public are all structural error.7
Eggs pointed to two Supreme Court cases in which the Court found errors
affecting the indictment to be structural.72 However, the Fourth Circuit noted
that in other cases the Court declined to find that indictment errors constituted
structural errors."3 Given the Court's overall reluctance to expand the category
of structural error, the Fourth Circuit declined to adopt a categorical rule that all
indictment error is structural.7 4 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit was persuaded by
the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
United State u Pmreiss.7  In PJtniss, the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court held that failure to instruct the jury on each element of the offense was
subject to harmless-error analysis.76 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because the
right to have a petit jury decide whether each element of the offense was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt was as important as the right to have a grand jury
review an indictment," 'JiJf denial of the former right is subject to harmless error
analysis, we believe denial of the latter right must be as well.""' 7 Therefore, the
Fourth Circuit determined that failure to allege a statutory aggravator in the
indictment was not a structural error, but was instead subject to harmless-error
review.78
IV. Applwatim n Va
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Hi creates a daunting hurdle for a federal
appellant seeking reversal in the Fourth Circuit on the ground that the indictment
70. Hip, 353 F.3d at 304; see Ner, 527 U.S. at 8 (discussing the limited circumstances in
which the Court would find an error strutur4a.
71. H4, 353 F.3d at 304-05.
72. Id at 305; see Vasquez v. Hrlery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986) (finding that racial
discrimination in the composition of a grand jury is structural error); Ballard v. United States, 329
U.S. 187, 195-96 (1946) (stating that sex discrimination in the composition of a grand jury is
structural error).
73. Hip, 353 F.3d at 305; sMehanik, 475 U.S. at 70-71 (finding that the simultaneous
presence of two witnesses in the grand jury room is not structural error).
74. Hi4, 353 F.3d at 305-06.
75. Id at 306; s United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 984 (10th Cr. 2001) (finding that
failure to allege an element of a crime in an indictment is subject to harmless-error review).
76. His, 353 F.3d at 306 (citing Protis, 256 F.3d at 984); seeNeier, 527 US. at 9 (stating that
jury instructions that fail to instruct on each element of an offense are not necessarily structural
error).




failed to allege a statutory aggravating or intent element. The court conceded
that Ring and Apprt-ii require that the indictment allege a statutory aggravating
and intent factor.79 However, based on the court's reasoning, an appellant is
unlikely to ever find relief from the court on such a claim. First, the court
decided that only one statutory aggravator and one intent factor need to be
alleged in the indictment and found by the jury." Moreover, because of
A lrrnarez- Toms, if the statutoryaggravatoris a prior conviction, then it does not
need to be alleged in the indictment at all." Finally, even if the statutoryaggrava-
tor or intent element is not alleged in the indictment, the appellant will still be
entitled to relief only if the error was not harmless. 2
Assuming the Government was to allege only one aggravating factor in the
indictment, and the aggravators based on prior convictions were not operative
in the case, the Government would assume a substantial risk under the Fourth
Circuit's analysis. The Fourth Circuit explicitly stated:
[T]hose intent and aggravating factors which the government intends
to rely upon to render a defendant death-eligible under the FDPA are
the finctional equivalent of elements of the capital offenses and must
be charged in the indictment submitted to th6 petit jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.'
This implies that the statutory aggravator charged in the indictment must also be
the one found bythe jurybeyond a reasonable doubt. If the Government alleged
only one aggravator in the indictment, but proved a different one to the jury,
then neither aggravator would fulfill the Fourth Circuit's requirement, and the
indictment would presumably be defective because the aggravating element
would not be satisfied by anyone aggravator. Therefore, in such a circumstance,
defense counsel would be well advised to focus their efforts on attacking the
aggravator or aggravators alleged in the indictment during the sentencing phase.
If the jury does not find them, then no aggravating element will have been
contained in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the indictment will be defective under Higg;.
If the defendant also has a prior conviction, then the strategyoutlined above
will be ineffective afterHigW. Higg; relied on the fact that underA lnran,- Torr
the prior conviction was not an element of an enhanced crime, but was rather a
sentence enhancer and therefore did not need to be alleged in the indictment.84
To the extent that A lnr-an- Torte was good law, the Fourth Circuit remained
79. Id at 297.
80. Id at 298.
81. Id at 302.
82. Id at 304.
83. Hi4, 353 F.3d at 298.
84. Id at 301-04.
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on solid ground; after all, in that case the Supreme Court "was squarelypresented
with the question of whether" an indictment needed to allege the existence of
prior convictions when the convictions were used to enhance the penalty.8 5
However, the Supreme Court has recently impinged that holding's vitality. In
Apm'i the Court stated, "As we made plain... last Term, A lnrrarz- Tones
represents at best an exceptional departure from the historic practice" of finding
that sentencing schemes which prohibit the jury from deciding facts which
enhance a defendant's sentence raise serious constitutional concerns.86 The
Court later acknowledged that "it is arguable that A lnrndaez- Tones was incor-
rectlydecided." 7 In his concurrence inRirgJustice Scalia re-affirmed his dissent
in A lInivz- Tas and stated his belief that "the fundamental meaning of the
jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts essential to imposi-
tion of the level of punishment that the defendant receives ... must be found by
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt."" By characterizing the Alnrndaz-Tones
rule as an exception to the Court's decisions in Ring and Appnvndi, the Fourth
Circuit implicitly acknowledged that its holding is contrary to those results. 9
Although A lnmavez- Tones remains good law, it appears that the Court is not
entirelysatisfied with the exception that it carves in the more recent trend in their
jurisprudence that all factors that may enhance a sentence past a statutory
maximum must be found by the jury. If the A 1nmz/a- Tonm exception should
be retired, then the Fourth Circuit would no longer have support for its ruling
that prior convictions are statutoryaggravators that do not need to be alleged in
the indictment.
Even if a federal appellant were to convince the Fourth Circuit that an
indictment was defective for failing to allege statutory aggravating or intent
factors, the appellant would still need to prove that the error was not harmless.'
At least one circuit has taken the view that failure to allege elements of a crime
in an indictment is structural error.91 However, many more circuits have taken
the opposite view.92 In light of the Supreme Court's recent application of the
85. Id at 302; see A lrnmie -Torn, 523 U.S. at 226.
86. Appnn-rk 530 U.S. at 486-87.
87. at 489.
88. Ribg 536 US. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. Hij, 353 F.3d at 303-04.
90. Id at 304.
91. SeUnited States v. DuBo, 186 F.3d 1177, 1179 (9th ar. 1999) (finding that if objected
to before trial, an indictment's failure to allege one element of the crime is not subject to harmless-
error review).
92. Si, eg, United States v. Allen, No. 98-2549, 2004 WL 188080, at *6 (8th CAr. Feb. 2,
2004) (declining to find failure to allege aggravating factors in an indictment structural error); United
States v. Suarez, 313 F.3d 1287, 1293-94 (11th Cr. 2002) (applying harmless-error review to a claim
that an indictment failed to allege factors that enhanced the sentence in violation of Appnmd);
United States v. Adldins, 274 F.3d 444, 454 (7th Cr. 2001) (reaffirming that Appmai errors in the
2004]
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plain error test to such a claim in Cater; the latter is probably the more viable
view.93 Recently, the Supreme Court strengthened this conclusion in the capital
context by holding that a state court's application of harmless-error review to a
defective indictment was not a sufficient ground to provide habeas relief to the
petitioner.
4
Nonetheless, other petitioners may have more success with showing that
failure to allege an aggravating factor in the indictment was not harmless." In
Hiff, the court based its finding that the error was harmless, in part, on the
ground that the aggravating factor not contained in the indictment was found by
the jury and went uncontroverted at trial.96 However, by vigorously contesting
each aggravating factor during the sentencing phase, again presuming the prior
conviction aggravator is not applicable to the proceedings, an appellant in the
Fourth Circuit maybe able to show that the error was not harmless. The Fourth
Circuit also found that the error was not harmless because the death notice and
the indictment's references to the statutes -ilggs was charged under put Higgs on
sufficient notice of the charges he faced.97 Indeed, the court stated that the
indictment was merely "defective because it failed to allege those essential
elements of the offenses, not because it charged an offense different from the
one for which he was ultimately convicted and sentenced."98
However, Justice Scalia recently noted that Ring aggravating factors are
elements that essentially make "the underlying offense of 'murder' a distinct,
lesser included offense of 'murder plus one or more aggravating circum-
stances.' "" Therefore, it appears that on some level the statutory aggravating
factors operate to enhance the murder from one crime, for which life is the
maximum sentence, to a different crime, for which death is the maximum
sentence. By failing to allege the statutory aggravators in the indictment, the
Government essentially charges the defendant with a lesser crime from the one
for which the defendant will ultimately be prosecuted. In that sense, the defec-
indictment warrant only harmless-error review); Phtiss, 256 F.3d at 984-85 (concluding that
harmless-error review is appropriate when an indictment fails to allege an element of a crime).
93. Sie Clam, 535 US. at 631 (applying a plain-error test to the respondent's forfeited claim
that the Government failed to allege an element of the offense in the indictment).
94. Se Mitchell v. Esparza, 124S. Cc. 7, 11-12 (2003) (per curiam) (finding that the state
court's decision that the failure to charge an aggravating factor in the indictment is subject to
harmless-error review is not adequate grounds upon which to grant habeas relief, despite the fact
it occurred in the capital context). For a complete discussion of MitaW see gnt!y Meghan H
Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 455 (analyzing Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S. Ct. 7, 11-12 (2003)
(Per curiam)).
95. Hiz, 353 F.3d at 304 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 745 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)).
96. Id at 307.
97. Id at 306-07.
98. Id at 306.
99. Sattazahnv . Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) (pluralityopinion).
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tive indictment fails to put the defendant on adequate notice to defend against
the charges because, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's assertions, it does indeed
charge a different crime. Therefore, even if the failure to allege a statutory
aggravator in an indictment is only subject to harmless-error review, it is not
clear, even under Higgs, that the review will always be favorable to the Govern-
ment. 100
The United States Supreme Court has declined to apply the Fifth Amend-
ment right to an indictment by the grand jury to the states.'' Nonetheless, in
Virginia, the accused has a firmly established statutory right to have the grand
jury return an indictment before standing trial for a felony.'0 2 Virginia courts
have long interpreted the statute to require the Commonwealth to allege each
element of the crime charged in the indictment.' 3 Therefore, the rationale
employed in Higgs should applywith equal force in Virginia. Because Rvgmade
aggravating factors into essential elements of the crime, and an indictment in
Virginia must allege each element of the crime charged, a Virginia indictment
must allege at least one aggravating factor.'"
However, the rules announced in Higgs would have a slightly different
impact in Virginia. Unlike the federal government, Virginia recognizes onlytwo
statutory aggravators: vileness and future dangerousness.' Certainly, evidence
of a prior conviction under the Virginia statutory scheme would help prove
future dangerousness. Indeed the statute explicitly states that the death penalty
may be imposed if the jury
100. S&eA!, 2004 WL 188080, at "9-*12 (finding that failure to allege aggravating factors
in the indictment is not harmless-error because it deprives the defendant of his right to have the
grand jury review his case and noting that if the error was harmless the right to a grand jury would
be drastically impinged). For a complete discussion of ALen, see gailly K. Brent Tomer, Case
Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 621 (2004) (analyzing United States v. Allen, No. 98-2549,2004 WL 188080,
at *1 (8th Cr. Feb. 2, 2004) and State v. Fortin, No. A-31-2001, 2004 WL 190051, at *1 (N.J. Feb.
3, 2004)).
101. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534 (1884).
102. SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (Mlchie 2000) (ensuring that "no person shall be put u:on
trial for any felony, unless an indictment or presentment shall have first been found or made y a
grand W).
103. Se Hagwood v. Commonwealth, 162 S.E. 10, 12 (Va. 1932) (finding that an indictment
must necessarily"set forth all of the essential elements of the crime, and, if anyof them are omitted,
it is fatallydefective"); Boyle v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 674, 674 (1858) ("It has been
long and well settled bythe courts of England, and bythe courts of Virginia, that an indictment for
any offence must allege every fact entering into the legal definition of such offence.").
104. SeeRin 536 U.S. at 609 (stating that aggravating circumstances are equivalent to elements
of a crime); HiW, 353 F.3d at 297-98 (finding that at least one statutory aggravating factor must
be alleged in the indictment); Hagurm4 162 S.E. at 12 (noting that an indictment must allege all
essential elements of a crime).
105. SeVA. CODE ANN. § 19 2-264.2 (ichie 2000) (stating that the jurymayonly impose the
death sentence if the jury finds the defendant poses an ongoing danger to society or that the crime
was committed in a particularly despicable manner).
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[A]fter consideration of the past criminal record of convictions
of the defendant, find[s] that there is a probabili that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing senious threat to society.'O'
This statute differs subtlyfrom the federal statute. Under the federal statute, the
factfinder must only find the existence of a prior conviction to enhance the
sentence to death. 7 In contrast, in Virginia, the factfinder, after considering the
existence of prior convictions, must then determine whether the defendant poses
a future danger to society.' This procedure is not simplya mechanical applica-
tion of a prior sentence to enhance the penalty to death. Rather, it requires an
individualized determination of all of the facts relating to the defendant in
evaluating whether he or she poses a continued threat to society. The simple fact
of a prior conviction is not enough to make the defendant death-eligible. There-
fore, it falls outside of the exception in A lnr am- Tore, and the aggravator of
future dangerousness would need to be alleged in a Virginia indictment. Unlike
in the Fourth Gircuit, after Higgs, a prior conviction alone would not be enough
to save an indictment that did not allege either of the Virginia aggravators.
However, because the jury needs to find only one statutory aggravator in
Virginia, the reasoning behind the ruling in Higgs, that the Government needs to
allege only one statutory aggravator in the indictment, applies to Virginia with
equal force."° Because only one statutory aggravator, if found by the jury, is
sufficient to make the defendant death-eligible in Virginia, then only one needs
to be alleged in the indictment."0 The other aggravator, following the Higgs
reasoning, could fairlybe said to be a sentence consideration."' Therefore,under
the rationale behind Hig, an indictment may be sufficient if it alleges only one
aggravating factor;, however, the prosecution would expose itself to the risk that
if the jurydid not find the aggravating factor in the indictment, the onlypossible
sentence would be life.
Finally, even if an appellant in Virginia shows that the prosecution failed to
allege aggravating elements in the indictments, the appellant would still need to
show that the error was not harmless. In Virginia "[b]efore a federal constitu-
tional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."'12 Because this standard is essen-
106. Id
107. 18 U.S.C S 2592(c)(2), (12) (2000) (stating that prior convictions for serious drug felonies
and violent felonies involving the use of firearms are statutory aggravators).
108. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2.
109. Id
110. HiM, 353 F.3d at 299.
111. Id
112. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 492 S.E.2d 131, 132 (Va. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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tiallythe same standard used bythe Fourth Circuit in Hiff, much of the court's
reasoning in that case could apply with equal force in Virginia."' Therefore, a
Virginia appellant might encounter the same difficulties Hflggs faced in showing
that the failure to allege aggravating elements in the indictment warrants relief.
Of course, a trial court should not rely on a possible future finding of harmless-




In Higg, the Fourth Circuit made it extremely difficult, but not impossible,
for a defendant who was convicted of a capital charge in federal court to chal-
lenge that conviction on the ground that the indictment failed to allege the
statutory aggravating and intent factors. After Hip, the defendant must show
that every aggravating factor the jury found was not in the indictment and was
not a prior conviction subject to theA lnm/aom- Toms exception. Moreover, even
if a defendant can make this difficult showing, the defendant still must show that
the error was not harmless. Because of Virginia's different statutoryaggravators,
the rationale behind the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the A lraiam- ToM excep-
tion should not apply in the Commonwealth.
Maxwell C Smith
113. SeHi4, 353 F.3d at 304 (finding error was harmless if the court decides "beyond a
reasonable doubt" that the error did not impact the verdict).
114. SwHackneyv. Commonwealth, 504 S-E.2d 385,389 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) ("The harmless
error doctrine should not be used prospectively bya trial court as a basis to disregard an established
rule of hw.).
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